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Atlantic Intersections: Early American 
Commerce and the Rise of the 
Spanish West Indies (Cuba) 
An Atlantic approach to the history of early American trade 
challenges traditional British opinions and, indeed, much Anglo-
American scholarship regarding the commercial prospects of 
the new United States. Contemporary Spanish observations, in 
contrast to the more familiar and widely cited ones in English, 
correctly predicted the post-Revolutionary War integration of 
American and Spanish imperial markets. As political, diplo-
matic, and economic upheavals broke down the old mercantil-
ist system, U.S. merchants quickly succeeded in exploiting their 
comparative advantage in the expanding Atlantic economy. The 
debate over the "decline" of the British West Indies is ampli-
fied by examining the concurrent "rise" of the Spanish West 
Indies, particularly Cuba, in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. 
Over the last few years the field of "Atlantic history" has become much more than an "idea": it is now an area of historical scholar-
ship forthrightly defined and practiced, thanks in no small part to Ber-
nard Bailyn and his International Seminar on the History of the Atlan-
tic World at Harvard University. While many of the new projects focus 
upon movements of specific peoples and ideologies around the Atlantic 
basin, an Atlantic approach offers exciting new avenues of inquiry and 
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insight for the study of trade. 1 Not only does a multilateral perspective 
broaden the basic story of the exchange of commodities; it also 
prompts specialists in traditional fields defined by nationality to refor-
mulate long-standing assumptions and explanations. This is especially 
the case regarding the commercial prospects, perceived and real, of the 
new United States. Conventional Anglo-American historiography sug-
gests that these prospects were bleak indeed, especially in the years im-
mediately after the American Revolution. Following the lead of John 
Baker Holroyd, Lord Sheffield, historians have focused upon Great Brit-
ain, France, and their remaining colonies as the major foreign trading 
partners of the thirteen colonies/states. However, it has become in-
creasingly clear that informed contemporaries regarded ports through-
out the Spanish Empire, particularly those in Cuba, as desirable and lu-
crative destinations for American exports and as sources of valuable 
imports, such as specie. Many American merchants, including Robert 
Morris, the first superintendent of finance, traded with Spanish impe-
rial ports for public and private gain. For these U.S. traders, Cuba quickly 
emerged as a dynamic substitute market for the British and French 
West Indies. Their wartime and post-Revolutionary experiences, in turn, 
paved the way for exploiting the unprecedented opportunities of the 
Napoleonic era. 
Early American Commerce with Cuba 
American economic historians are often wary of the late eighteenth 
century, considering it a statistical dark age due to large and frequent 
gaps in the quantitative record. However, materials from previously 
1 For the "idea" of Atlantic history and a current appraisal of the field, see Bernard Bailyn, 
Atlantic History: Concept and Contours (Cambridge, Mass., 2005). A very useful recent in-
troduction is "Round Table Conference: The Nature of Atlantic History," Itinerario, 23 (1999): 
48-173. Also see David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., The British Atlantic World, 
1500-1800 (New York, 2002), particularly Armitage's essay, "Three Concepts of Atlantic 
History," 11-27, as well as Nicholas Canny, "Writing Atlantic History; or Reconfiguring the 
History of Colonial British America," Journal of American History 86 (Dec. 1999): 1093-
114, and the wider-ranging essays in Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy, eds., Negoti-
ated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820 (New York, 2002). 
See the special issue, "The Atlantic Economy in an Era of Revolutions," William and 
Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 62 (July 2005), for admirable efforts to move beyond an Anglo-
American frame of reference. Economic historians have employed an Atlantic approach, 
most frequently and impressively with regard to studies of slavery and the slave trade; see 
David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (New York, 
1987), and, more recently, The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas (Cambridge, 2000). 
For Anglo-American trade and finance, see John J. Mccusker and Kenneth Morgan, eds., 
The Early Modern Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, 2000), as well as John J. McCusker, Es-
says in the Economic History of the Atlantic World (New York, 1997), and David Hancock, 
"The British Atlantic World: Coordination, Complexity, and the Emergence of an Atlantic 
Market Economy, 1651-1815,'' Itinerario 23 (1999): 107-26. 
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Etching of Robert Morris by Albert Rosenthal after a portrait by Gilbert Stuart, n.d. From the 
Society Portrait Collection. Courtesy of The Historical Society of Pennsylvania. AB a long-
time private trader and the first superintendent of finance of the United States, Morris had a 
particular interest in the North American trade with Cuba before and after independence. 
unexploited Spanish archives add some quantitative and much qualita-
tive data. Along with newly published sources in English, specifically 
The Papers of Robert Morris, they signal an improved understanding 
of the nature and origins of commercial ties between the thirteen 
colonies/states and Cuba. For example, even if quantitative estimates 
of the magnitude of the trade remain incomplete, it is clear that far 
more than occasional "smuggling" was involved on the eve of the Ameri-
can Revolution.2 These initial ventures are significant, moreover, because 
2 Severe inconsistencies in reporting and preserving records, coupled with shifting identi-
fications of products ("cereals" vs. "wheat" vs. "flour"), volumes ("barrels" vs. "pounds"), and 
trading partners ("Pennsylvania" vs. "Philadelphia," "Spanish West Indies" vs. "Cuba") by the 
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they paved the way for American domination of the Cuban market, first 
during the Napoleonic Wars, then after 1819, when Spain opened its 
"ever faithful isle" to "free trade." 
How did a trader like Robert Morris become so interested in Cuba? 
Conventional wisdom points to the Anglo-American occupation of Ha-
vana for ten months toward the close of the Seven Years' War as a turn-
ing point in commercial relations between the British and Spanish col-
onies. However, new research by Sherry Johnson establishes that 
environmental crises in the late 1760s and 1770s sparked food short-
ages across the Caribbean, but particularly in Cuba, that led Spanish of-
ficials to grant unprecedented trading concessions to Morris and his 
business partner, Thomas Willing.3 Morris's firm was chosen because 
of its already extensive experience in both Spanish and non-Spanish 
Caribbean markets. By the mid-177os, this trader and public servant 
anticipated that the demand for U.S. foodstuffs would only increase as 
the Revolutionary War persisted. In 1778, Morris shrewdly formed his 
business partnership with Juan de Miralles, a Spanish provisions mer-
chant sent by Charles III to "observe" the Continental Congress. By the 
time Spain was pulled into the war a year later, Cuba's already increas-
ing white population had swelled with imperial troops. These consumers 
preferred wheat-flour products, and peninsular and Spanish American 
suppliers simply could not meet the demand. Direct commerce be-
tween the North American mainland and the island was thus formally 
legitimized by the Spanish. The Philadelphia region began to exert its 
respective governments, make it difficult to generate reliable quantitative estimates of the 
trade between the United States and Cuba before 1821 and certainly not for that commerce 
during the pre-Revolutionary years. Sometimes the number of ships traveling between ports 
is the best available proxy of early patterns of exchange, as used by Roy Nichols, "Trade Rela-
tions and the Establishment of United States Consulates in Spanish America, 1779-1809," His-
panic American Historical Review 8 (1933): 289-313. "Smuggling" is a term whose working 
definition shifted according to moment and circumstance. Specific shipments did, of course, 
violate the letter of changing national laws, or sometimes merely their spirit; accusations 
were levied that were with or without merit. At least the latter category generated legal docu-
ments that economic historians can utilize to elucidate the complexities of trade. 
For indications of the composition and magnitude of the United States-Cuba trade fol-
lowing the American Revolution, see Linda K. Salvucci, "Supply, Demand and the Making of 
a Market: Philadelphia and Havana, 1780-1830," in Franklin W. Knight and Peggy K. Liss, 
eds., Atlantic Port Cities: Economy, Culture and Society in the Atlantic World, 1650-1850 
(Knoxville, 1991): 40-57. For a creative approach to calculating post-Revolutionary trade, see 
Javier Cuenca Esteban, "Trends and Cycles in U.S. Trade with Spain and the Spanish Empire, 
1790-1819," Journal of Economic History 44 (1984): 521-41. For analysis of the Cuba trade 
after 1821, when much better quantitative data are available, see Linda K. Salvucci and Rich-
ard J. Salvucci, "Cuba and the Latin American Terms of Trade in the Nineteenth Century: Old 
Theories, New Evidence," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 31 (Autumn 2000): 197-222. 
3 Sherry Johnson, "El Nifio, Environmental Crisis, and the Emergence of Alternative Mar-
kets in the Hispanic Caribbean, 176os-177os," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., vol. 62 
(July 2005): 365-410. 
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comparative advantage over northern Spanish and Mexican grain pro-
ducers, who were increasingly unable to compete.4 Not coincidentally, 
produce- and mail-laden ships belonging to Morris and Miralles were 
the very first to sail from Philadelphia to Havana. These early and suc-
cessful ventures were cut short by Miralles's death the next year. How-
ever, his successor, Francisco Rendon, quickly extended new and lucra-
tive provision contracts for Spanish troops in Cuba to Morris and to 
several other merchants from Pennsylvania and Maryland.s The grant-
ing of favors was not one sided. In May 1782, when Rendon failed to re-
ceive remittances from home, Morris "offered him a supply of money." 
At the same time, Morris asked that Rendon support his request to pro-
tect U.S. trade, and the Spaniard promised to do so. 6 
This was neither the first nor the last example of Morris blending 
his "private" interests as a trader with his "public" responsibilities as 
the new superintendent of finance. 7 Indeed, from the summer of 1781 
onward, Morris was immersed in a series of complicated maneuvers to 
draw upon loans made to the United States by European powers by 
selling his bills of exchange at Havana, where he judged the rates would 
be most favorable for the Americans. 8 For early American specialists, 
now able to follow the twists and turns of Morris's complex scheme, the 
Havana mission provides a nuts-and-bolts case study of the precarious 
nature of Revolutionary finances. Moreover, this transaction offers a 
sobering context for understanding the Continental Congress's sluggish 
support of its own army.9 Morris's urgency in securing specie, it turns 
out, was motivated not just by the obvious need for a circulating 
4 Fernando Barreda, Comercio maritimo entre los Estados Unidos y Santander (1778-
1829) (Santander, 1950); Pablo Tornero Tinajero, "Comerciantes, hacendados y politica mer-
cantil en Cuba. La rivalidad Cadiz-Estados Unidos (1763-1800)," en Andalucia y America 
en el siglo XVIII: Actas de las IV jornadas de Andalucia y America (Seville, 1985), 119-45; 
Luis J. Ramos, "Navios extranjeros habilitados como nacionales para efectuar el comercio 
con America a mediados de! siglo XVIII," and Demetrio Ramos Perez, "El problema de los 
embarques de harinas en los registros para America," in Coloquio de Historia Canario-
Americana (1977), vol. 2 (Gran Canaria, 1979), 21-32, 35-44; Guy P. C. Thomson, Puebla de 
las Angeles: Industry and Society in a Mexican City, 1700-1850 (Boulder, 1989). 
SLight Townsend Cummins, Spanish Observers and the American Revolution, 1775-
1783 (Baton Rouge, 1991), 126-28, 161-62, 174-75. On page 169, Cummins notes, "Because 
of Miralles, hundreds of Americans went to Havana in a growing commerce that provided 
significant contact between the Spanish colony and important North Atlantic ports." 
6 E. Jam es Ferguson and John Catanzariti, eds., The Papers of Robert Morris, 1781-1784, 
vol. 5 (Pittsburgh, 1980), 189-90. 
7Mary A. Y. Gallagher, "Private Interest and the Public Good: Settling the Score for the 
Morris-Holker Business Relationship, 1778-1790," Pennsylvania History 69 (Spring 2002): 
179-209. 
8 Morris laid out his plan in a letter to the Governor of Cuba in E. James Ferguson, The 
Papers of Robert Morris, 1781-1784, vol. 1(Pittsburgh,1973), 311-16. 
9 E. Wayne Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration 
and American Political Culture, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill, 1984). 
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medium, but also by the desperate requirement to pay the Continental 
troops. The state assemblies and the Confederation Congress were not 
merely full of tight-fisted republicans reluctant to ante up the cash; 
there also simply was not enough hard currency in circulation to meet 
the obligations to George Washington's men. Thus, Morris sought to 
reassure the general on October 16, 1782, writing, "I know that some 
money is necessary, and my efforts to obtain it, both at home and abroad, 
have been unceasing. I am now about to purchase a vessel, and send a 
person on board of her to the Havanna [sic], for the purpose of vending 
bills of exchange to the amount of half a million dollars."10 
As an experienced private trader, the superintendent knew what 
most Latin Americanists take for granted: millions of pesos of Mexican 
silver flowed into Cuba each year under an imperial funding program 
known as the situado, or subvention. Even more specie than usual had 
accumulated in Havana as a result of war-induced blockades. 11 Morris 
hoped to tap this enhanced supply, which could be used for general cir-
culation in the United States and for enhancing the credit of the Bank 
of North America. Evidently some specie did manage to find its way 
north; by April 25, 1783, one of Morris's associates noted: "We have an 
immence [sic] sum of Specie in the different States-a very large propor-
tion of it in the Massachusetts, Connecticut and this state [Pennsylvania]-
a great deal of which has been extracted from the Havannah, a large Sum 
from France, and no trifling sum from New York. ... "12 Interestingly, in 
Great Britain, Francis Baring, merchant and financial advisor to [Wil-
liam Petty Fitzmaurice], the Earl of Shelburne, the recent prime minister, 
discounted this report, because he could not imagine how the Ameri-
cans would have been able to obtain the supply. 13 This suggests that 
influential members of the British political establishment did not yet 
comprehend the scope and extent of the trade between their rebellious 
colonies and the Spanish West Indies. 
But how was Morris able to find trustworthy individuals willing 
and able to carry out the tasks of negotiating through conflicting levels 
of the Spanish imperial bureaucracy in Cuba and then outrunning en-
emy attack ships on the trip home? Here again The Papers of Robert 
10 John Catanzariti and E. James Ferguson, eds., The Papers of Robert Morris, vol. 6 
(Pittsburgh, 1984), 604. 
11 John Catanzariti, ed., The Papers of Robert Morris, vol. 7 (Pittsburgh, 1988), 497m3. 
12 Samuel Inglis and Co. to John and Francis Baring, Philadelphia, 25 Apr. 1783, in Catan-
zariti, ed., The Papers of Robert Morris, vol.7, p. 753. 
'3 Baring's skepticism is referenced in Catanzari, ed., The Papers of Robert Morris, vol. 7, 
p. 716m. However, Phineas Bond, the British consul resident in Philadelphia, estimated that 
over 500,000 pesos entered the port in 1787 alone: see Arthur P. Whitaker, "Reed and Forde: 
Merchant Adventurers of Philadelphia," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 
61 (1937): 244-45. 
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Morris provide much illuminating detail. The superintendent had to 
induce other experienced traders, such as John Barry and Oliver Pol-
lock, to deliver the specie by allowing them to trade on their own ac-
counts while carrying out his instructions for the public benefit. Several 
did manage to sell their own private cargoes in Havana and to pocket 
unknown profits that must have made the risks and demands of such 
ventures worthwhile. But Pollock ran into exceptional difficulties. At 
the start of 1783, when Spain threatened to revoke the Americans' di-
rect trading privileges with Cuba, Morris hoped to have the well-connected 
Pollock recognized as the new U.S. commercial agent in Havana. The 
superintendent also wanted to help Pollock settle his considerable gov-
ernment accounts and personal debts through permitting the sale of 
his private cargoes of flour in Cuba. These proved to be conflicting goals-
or else Pollock was far less lucky than his counterparts-when Spanish 
officials confiscated contraband goods in some of his flour barrels. True to 
form, the Havana bakers' guild managed to grab up the flour anyway, 
but Pollock never was recognized as the official U.S. agent. In fact, he 
ended up in prison the next year, as imperial bureaucrats now sought to 
repress direct American trade with Cuba. 14 
Their ability to do so was short lived. Though Morris himself went 
bankrupt and lost his government position, the genie, so to speak, had 
been let out of the bottle. Subsequent secretaries of finance and of the 
treasury did not directly engage in the Cuba trade, but numerous other 
Americans jumped at the opportunity to do so. Philadelphia merchants, 
such as John Leamy, used religious and family connections to great ad-
vantage to curry favor with Spanish officials and thus exploit this rap-
idly expanding market. 15 In essence, they overcame risk by navigating 
cultural issues in the increasingly cosmopolitan and complex environ-
ment that led to the demise of mercantilism and the shift to free trade. 
Interests in Great Britain either ignored or denied the emergence of re..: 
ciprocal trade advantages between the United States and Cuba, or per-
haps they simply were not well advised. An Atlantic approach to analyz-
ing the breakdown of the first British Empire calls into question the 
extent to which the former metropolis was able to control the trade of 
its ex-colonies. 
'
4 There is an admirable four-page head note in The Papers of Robert Morris that re-
counts Pollock's misadventures in the context of the impending postwar restrictions on di-
rect trade between the United States and Spain's prized colony. Elizabeth M. Nuxoll and 
Mary A. Gallagher, eds., The Papers of Robert Morris, 1781-1784, vol. 8 (Pittsburgh, 1995), 
62-65. 
15 For Leamy's trading career, see Linda K. Salvucci, "Anglo-American Merchants and 
Stratagems for Success in Spanish Imperial Markets, 1783-1807," in Jacques Barbier and 
Allan J. Kuethe, eds., The North American Role in the Spanish Imperial Economy, 1760-
1819 (Manchester, 1984), 127-33, 214-17. 
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Lord Sheffield's Predictions from London 
Ever since John Baker Holroyd, Lord Sheffield, published his Ob-
servations on the Commerce of the American States in 1783, American 
and British students of early United States history have portrayed the 
economic prospects of the new nation in a relentlessly pessimistic light. 
For example, Jeremy Atack and Peter Passell begin their survey of for-
eign trade and commercial policy in the development of the new nation 
as follows: 
Independence from British rule did not immediately liberate the 
United States from mercantilist restrictions. Instead the United 
States merely switched from the role of active participant within the 
British imperial system to that of outsider in a world dominated by 
large mercantilist powers. This change did not bode well for the new 
nation. British markets were shut to American exporters, unprotected 
American shipping fell prey to pirates, and Spanish and French mer-
cantilist regulations made it difficult to make up lost trade else-
where in Europe. One might thus expect that the foreign trade sector 
that had loomed so large in late colonial development, especially in 
such port cities as Baltimore, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, 
would have been hard hit. 
This introductory paragraph then shifts gears with the surprising 
judgment, "If so, it soon recovered."16 Only then do the authors point 
out that the export trade of the new United States exceeded the impres-
sive levels of the late colonial period by "perhaps 30 percent." Even in 
the absence of comprehensive serial data, conventional economic theory 
suggests the possibility of a rapid substitution of non-British Carib-
bean markets. Likewise, familiarity with the historical record of rapidly 
changing commercial circumstances during the Napoleonic Wars indi-
cates extraordinary opportunities for U.S. traders within a decade of 
the signing of the Treaty of Paris. Yet, the tenor of Atack and Passell's 
initial remarks fixes the impression of doom and gloom. To be sure, their 
approach only mirrors that of the secondary literature they cite.17 These 
'
6 John Baker Holroyd, Lord Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of the United 
States with Europe and the West Indies . .. (London, 6th ed., 1784). This edition is the most 
frequently cited, probably because it contains an enlarged appendix and index. For the text-
book quotation, see Jeremy Atack and Peter Passell, A New Economic View of American 
History from Colonial Times to 1940, 2nd ed. (New York, 1994), u2. 
17 Authors listed in Atack and Passell's bibliography include Donald R. Adams Jr., "Amer-
ican Neutrality and Prosperity, 1793-1808: A Reconsideration," Journal of Economic His-
tory 40 (1980): 713-37; Gordon C. Bjork, '"The Weaning of the American Economy: Indepen-
dence, Market Changes, and Economic Development," Journal of Economic History 24 
(1964): 541-66; Claudia D. Goldin and Frank D. Lewis, "The Role of Exports in American 
Economic Growth during the Napoleonic Wars, 1793 to 1807," Explorations in Economic 
History 17 (1980): 6-25; Gary M. Walton and James F. Shepherd, The Economic Rise of 
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works, in turn, reflect a widespread-at times exclusive-reliance upon 
the most accessible contemporary commentary published in English, 
Lord Sheffield's Observations. 
The major points of this extensively cited source may be summa-
rized as follows. In retaliation for American political independence, 
Lord Sheffield proposed an aggressive trade strategy that would render 
the United States a continued commercial vassal of Great Britain. How? 
In essence, he advocated that the newly independent United States be 
denied any benefits that accrued from trade with the remainder of the 
first British Empire. To prohibit mainland commerce with the British 
West Indies, he asserted, was to close off the most lucrative market for 
U.S. domestic exports. Lord Sheffield even alleged that American grain 
production was unimpressive and that it would not continue at high 
levels indefinitely. In his mind, then, the Jeffersonian dream of an agri-
cultural republic was just that and nothing more. At the same time, 
Lord Sheffield fervently maintained that British merchants could easily 
flood the American market with manufactured goods, as well as pro-
vide superior shipping services. 
In this last prediction of the postwar dumping of British goods, 
Lord Sheffield was proved correct. However, ongoing research in Atlan-
tic history shows that he was much mistaken regarding the lack of al-
ternative markets for U.S. domestic exports and the American capac-
ity to increase grain production. Recent publication of The Wealth of 
Nations notwithstanding, Lord Sheffield's vision remained clouded by 
mercantilist or neomercantilist impulses. 18 He staunchly defended im-
perial Great Britain and its Navigation Acts, articulating the negative side 
of what became a vigorous parliamentary debate over the relaxation of 
Early America (Cambridge, 1979). Curtis P. Nettles, The Emergence of a National Economy, 
1775-1815 (New York, 1962), is the standard overview. 
Other treatments that offer similar interpretations but are not cited by Atack and Passell 
include John J. Mccusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-
1789 (Chapel Hill, 1985); and Ronald Hoffman, John J. Mccusker, Russell Menard, and Peter 
J. Albert, eds., The Economy of Early America: The Revolutionary Period, 1763-1790 
(Charlottesville, 1988). 
A fuller picture emerges when the above are read in conjunction with John H. Coats-
worth, "American Trade with European Colonies and the Caribbean and South America, 
1790-1812," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 24 (1967): 243-66; and F. Crouzet, 
"Variations on the North American Triangle from Yorktown to Waterloo: Substitution, Com-
plementarity, Parallelism," in Charles P. Kindleberger and Guido di Tella, eds., Economics in 
the Long View: Essays in Honor of W. W. Rostow, 3 vols. (New York, 1982), vol. 2, pp. 44-
66. Also see the older but still useful Anna C. Clauder, American Commerce as Affected by 
the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, 1793-1812 (Philadelphia, 1932); and 
Helen Louise Klopfer, "Statistics of the Foreign Trade of Philadelphia, 1700-1860" (MSS. at 
the Eleutherian-Mills Historical Library, 1937). 
'
8 See John E. Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the Amer-
ican Revolution (Baltimore, 1993), for characterization of Sheffield as a neomercantilist. 
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trade restrictions on Britain's former colonies. Given that Lord Shef-
field wrote from a distinctly partisan and a not wholly informed point 
of view, and given the ready rebuttals of his gloomy predictions by 
Tench Coxe and Thomas Paine among others, it is surprising that 
Anglo-American historians and economists have so long privileged his 
calculations and forecasts. 19 When examined from a broader Atlantic 
perspective, however, Lord Sheffield's views are challenged and ren-
dered to some degree irrelevant. 
Spanish Observations from America 
Contemporary Spanish sources recount a story that is markedly 
different from Sheffield's version of early American commercial pros-
pects. During the very same months in 1782 and 1783 that Sheffield 
penned his Observations in faraway London, the Spaniard Francisco 
Rendon was at work on the scene in Philadelphia, preparing two mem-
oranda for his superiors in Madrid on the finances and foreign trade of 
the new United States.20 By then, this career bureaucrat had resided in 
the American port for nearly five years, first as personal secretary to 
Charles Ill's original "observer" to the Continental Congress, Juan de 
Miralles, then as the ranking Spanish observer in the United States in his 
own right. Before his untimely death on April 28, 1780, at George Wash-
ington's headquarters in Morristown, Miralles, operating openly as a 
provisions merchant and clandestinely as a spy, had cultivated the 
American political establishment and sent vital intelligence to Madrid. 
He also shipped mid-Atlantic flour to feed Spanish troops stationed in 
Cuba. Following Miralles's death, Rendon, formerly posted in Havana 
itself, continued to oversee and shape the expanding trade between the 
19 Jacob E. Cooke, Tench Coxe and the Early Republic (Chapel Hill, 1978). Coxe's rebut-
tal, A Brief Examination of Lord Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of the United 
States, was printed in six installments in the American Museum from March through July of 
1791 and was subsequently published in pamphlet form. Also see Thomas Paine, "A Supernu-
merary Crisis, December 9, 1783," in Charles J. Norman, ed., The Crisis Papers, 1776-1783, 
by Thomas Paine (Albany, N.Y., 1990), 182-85. A number of West Indian planters, traders, 
and colonial officials also refuted Sheffield's arguments; for one example, see Edward Long, 
A free and candid Review of a Tract, entitled "Observations on the Commerce of the Ameri-
can States," showing the pernicious consequences, both to Great Britain, and to the British · 
Sugar Islands, of the Systems recommended in that Tract (London, 1784), Goldsmith's-
Kress Llbrary of Economic Llterature, reel no. 1276, book no. 12628.15. 
2
° Francisco Rendon, "Memoria sobre las fianzas de los Treze Estados Unidos de America 
Septentrional," 20 Apr. 1782; and "Primera y Segunda parte de la memoria sobre las produ-
ciones exportaciones e Ymportaciones y modo de hacer el comercio con los Estados Unidos: 
Que Don Francisco Rendon remite al Exmo Sefior Don J. de Galvez," 8 Sept. 1783, Archivo 
General de Indias, Seville (hereafter AGI), Santo Domingo (hereafter SD), legajo (hereafter 
leg.) 2597. The original bundle of documents has been microfilmed, and photocopies are 
available from the Tulane University Library. 
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Various plans and drafts of cities, towns, and harbors drawn from the harbors of Havana, 
Charlestown, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, ca. 1782. Courtesy of The Library Company of 
Philadelphia. Although the cartographer is unknown, the inclusion of Havana suggests the 
importance of trading connections between the Spanish colony and the North American 
mainland in the era of the American Revolution. 
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American revolutionaries and the Spanish colony. This day-to-day, nuts-
and-bolts experience offered Rendon plenty of opportunity for contact 
with Robert Morris and other merchants anxious to sell U.S. produce to 
non-British West Indian consumers. Not only did Rendon and Morris 
serve as joint executors of Miralles's estate; they also collaborated in 
developing a "commercial operation that became a major source of food 
for Cuba" and the source of considerable profits for most participants. 21 
Such direct and frequent access to high-ranking U.S. officials pro-
vided Rendon with privileged sources of information for his memo-
randa regarding the economic prospects of the thirteen states. He was 
not a patsy of the American leaders, however. In addition to congres-
sional records, Rendon also utilized reports from foreign merchants 
trading in Philadelphia and enjoyed a solid working relationship with the 
French envoy. Moreover, Rendon consciously strove for impartiality in 
his interpretations and was said to lack the "magic ingredient" for full 
acceptance at the Congress-that is, sufficient enthusiasm for the 
American cause.22 Unlike Lord Sheffield's, then, Rend6n's observa-
tions were current, first-hand, and not overtly partisan. 
It is the second part of Rendon's second memorandum that offers 
the most pertinent insights into the prospects for American commerce. 
Here it is his primary contention that "England still does not perceive 
the extent of its loss." Ironically, Rendon quoted one of Lord Sheffield's 
political opponents, the aforementioned Earl of Shelburne, who com-
mented that "the sun of Great Britain set with the independence of 
America."23 Rendon appeared to be very familiar with the factions within 
the British House of Commons, alluding to [William Pitt the Younger] 
the Earl of Chatham's estimates of the profits of colonial trade at one 
point and refuting those in Commons who argued that the English and 
Americans were still a single people. Still, Rendon did concede that 
Great Britain might enjoy preference in the trade of the United States 
for several reasons: prior French attempts to unload shoddy merchan-
dise, mainly inferior textiles, on the American market; the persistent 
shortage of specie in the United States; and the fiscal and commercial 
regulations of other European powers that formed significant obstacles 
21 Cummins, Spanish Observers, esp. 174 and 180. Also see Josep M. Bernades, Els cata-
lans a /es indies (1493-1830), vol. 1 (Barcelona, 1992), 287-89, for a recent biographical 
sketch of Miralles. 
22 Cummins, Spanish Observers, 170. 
23 In addition to the original Spanish source utilized above, there exists a typescript of an 
English translation of Rend6n's second memorial in the Aileen Moore Topping Translations, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, of which John McCusker supplied a copy. See 
Cummins, Spanish Observers, p. 211, for a brief explanation of the dimensions of Topping's 
project. My own translation agrees closely with hers; there are no original page numbers to 
cite in either the Spanish or English versions. 
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to U.S. trade. More concretely and practically, Rendon suggested that 
the French could supplant the American demand for Portuguese wines 
other than Madeira if the price were right. He also predicted that, after 
France, Holland would have the greatest trade with the United States, 
since the Dutch seemed to anticipate demand very shrewdly. Of late, 
they had shipped variegated cargoes, including "skates, which are a 
kind of go-cart with which they run over ice. This proves how much at-
tention they devote to providing necessities to the people with whom 
they trade." 
In a straightforward, nonobsequious tone that rarely characterizes 
the writings of Spanish imperial bureaucrats to their superiors, Rendon 
pointed out that Spain was not presently able to compete with England, 
France, and Holland in trading with the United States. There were not 
enough factories on the peninsula to enable Spain "to match their in-
dustries." However, Rendon believed that Spain could capture some of 
the American market for superfine woolen cloth, due to the inherent 
superiority of the Spanish product and to the fact that, "despite the ex-
cessive heat experienced here from May until mid-September one 
rarely sees a suit not made of wool." He thought that Spain might also 
be able to capture some of the trade in wines, sugars, oils, fruits, some 
silks, and counterpanes. Moreover, he recommended that a network of 
consuls and Spanish traders on the scene would boost American confi-
dence in peninsular products. It is worth noting that the system Rendon 
envisioned was in place by the time Consul General Valentin Foronda 
arrived on the U.S. mainland in 1802. Rendon also drew explicit atten-
tion to the lands west of the Appalachians as a potential market for 
Spanish exports. Issues pertaining to the navigation of the Mississippi 
River, of course, soon became the more closely studied focus of diplo-
matic negotiations between the two nations. 
Beyond this tempered and candid assessment of Spain's prospects 
for trade with the United States, Rendon made some more general pre-
dictions in 1783. Canada, he thought, would prove unprofitable and ex-
pensive for the British. And, unlike Lord Sheffield, he cautioned that al-
though Americans were debtors, the "prodigious production" of their 
lands enabled them to meet their obligations. Two centuries later, Javier 
Cuenca Esteban's painstaking calculations unwittingly proved that 
Rendon's predictions were right on the mark: in essence, the United 
States was able to pay for its British imports in the 1790s and early 
1800s by making its balances on trade with the Spanish Empire. 24 
From his vantage point in Philadelphia, Rendon actually wor-
ried that the British government would be farsighted enough to grant 
2 4 Cuenca Esteban, "Trends and Cycles," 521-41. 
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concessions to the Americans in order to attract their confidence. In 
particular, the Spanish observer feared that Americanswould be free to 
trade with the British Caribbean islands as part of a strategy to cement 
trade ties between the former colonies and their metropolis at the ex-
pense of the other European powers. Therefore, in contrast to Lord 
Sheffield's defensive, if not punitive reaction, Rendon's logic dictated 
that Great Britain respond to postwar imperatives in an innovative, dis-
tinctly nonmercantilist way. Yet this was not to be. Indeed, the collec-
tive mentality of British policymakers in the 1780s puts one in mind of 
the inability to "think triumphantly" that had plagued their predeces-
sors once the tide turned toward victory in the Seven Years' War some 
two decades earlier. 2 5 
Rendon closed his second memorial by reporting that his contacts 
in Philadelphia and New York "insist with the greatest tenacity that it is 
in the interests of the European Powers to grant to the United States 
free trade with the islands." To underscore this point, he also forwarded 
to his superiors in Madrid a letter written by an American politician 
and trader, who may have been Robert Morris. 26 This letter argued in 
the strongest possible terms for the full opening of the Spanish islands, 
particularly Cuba, to U.S. trade. Although Rendon carefully recorded 
that he found some of the arguments advanced to be "specious to say 
the least" and "too delicate for me to form an opinion," he nevertheless 
transmitted the document to the Spanish court, ostensibly in the pro-
cess of determining whether or not to allow continued American access 
to Cuba. While he and the U.S. merchants involved awaited the deci-
sion from Madrid, Rendon continued to issue the necessary permits to 
allow Philadelphia ships to sail for Havana, even as some imperial bu-
reaucrats there, operating under different imperatives, tried in vain to 
minimize contact. 
These actions suggest that Rendon actually entertained the possi-
bility that Spain would not revert to traditional mercantilist policies and 
close the Cuban trade to U.S. shippers after the peace treaty was signed. 
The American letter writer had insisted "that if Spain would permit the 
free introduction of American Products into its islands, such would 
be the abundance which would reign in them that her planters would be 
able to dedicate all their work and attention to the improvement of 
25 See John M. Murrin, "The French and Indian War, the American Revolution, and the 
Counterfactual Hypothesis: Reflections on Lawrence Henry Gipson and John Shy," Reviews 
in American History 1 (Sept. 1973): 307-18, for the backward-looking mentality of the Brit-
ish ministers after the great victory over France. 
26 Nuxoll and Gallagher, eds., The Papers of Robert Morris, vol. 8, pp. 467-79, for a 
printed Spanish version of the letter and an English translation of the same, preceded by a 
learned and lengthy annotation that explores the question of authorship. Special thanks go to 
Betty Nuxoll for clarifying some points about this document. 
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their Plantations, by which means they would quickly enrich themselves 
and consequently they would enrich the Nation to which they belong." 
Yet this classic formulation of the theory of comparative advantage 
grafted onto a more familiar mercantilist rationale did not persuade 
peninsular decision-makers. Despite detailed calculations regarding the 
yields of sugar and wheat, respectively, and despite repeated insistence 
that the British islands had prospered before the Revolution only be-
cause of their trade with the mainland, the pleas of the letter writer 
went unheeded. As most American historians are quick to point out, 
Spain reimposed the prohibition on direct trade between the United 
States and the Spanish West Indies in 1784. 27 
Was there any real possibility that Spain might have acceded to 
these requests emanating from Philadelphia? If so, hope was undoubt-
edly dashed once Great Britain-to Rendon's professed surprise-
restricted American access to the British West Indies. News of this Brit-
ish decision reached Philadelphia soon after Rendon had completed his 
memorial. Nevertheless, he transmitted it and the American letter in-
tact to Spain. These forward-looking arguments probably did not arrive 
in time to influence significantly the higher levels of Spanish imperial 
administration. Moreover, the Spanish observer undermined his own 
credibility by engaging in an amorous relationship that became in-
creasingly public around this time. Rendon shocked proper Philadel-
phians by living openly with Margarite Marshall, a woman from an 
American family lacking both commercial success and social status. Of 
even greater concern to the Spanish crown was the fact that Miss Mar-
shall was a Protestant, and thus an unsuitable candidate for marriage 
to a rising imperial bureaucrat. Rendon nearly wrecked his career with 
this scandalous liaison. His petition to marry her languished, and he 
was demoted to secretary of the legation once Diego de Gardoqui ar-
rived as Spain's first fully accredited representative in Philadelphia. 
Rendon was supposed to assist Gardoqui, but the two did not work well 
together. To avoid further embarrassment, Rendon was recalled to Madrid 
in 1786. Once there, he renounced his true love, who was waiting pa-
tiently in Philadelphia to join him at his next post. His career back on 
track, Rendon then was named the intendant of Louisiana. 28 
Most early Americanists recognize the name of Diego de Gardoqui, 
who was from a prominent merchant family in Bilbao and had previously 
27The immediate situation is carefully reconstructed by James A. Lewis, "Anglo-American 
Entrepreneurs and the Significance of the Expulsion of 1784-1785," in Barbier and. Kuethe, 
eds., The North American Role, 112-26, 210-14. 
28 Cummins, pp. 192-95, summarizes the scandal, which was the subject of numerous 
pieces of correspondence in several of the legajos I have consulted in Spain. Miguel Gomez 
del Campillo, Relaciones diplomaticas entre Espana y las Estados Unidos (Madrid, 1944), 
xix-xxi, maintains that Gardoqui himself argued strongly against the marriage. 
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managed Spain's consular service in London. They associate him with 
the diplomatic negotiations surrounding navigation of the Mississippi 
River. What many have not realized, however, is that his two assistants, 
Josef de Jaudenes and Jose Ignacio de Viar, spent much of their time 
during the 1790s in Philadelphia, overseeing a revived trade between 
the United States and Cuba. In other words, since Revolutionary and 
early national historiographies conventionally break around 1789 or 
1790, Americanists often fail to recognize that the Spanish trade ban 
imposed in 1784 was short lived. In fact, by 1789 Bourbon restrictions 
had already been modified to permit direct trade between the United 
States and Cuba under certain circumstances. 2 9 It was a surprisingly 
quick recognition of economic imperatives on the island. And, by the 
end of the next decade, thanks to the Napoleonic Wars, most formal 
commercial regulations were unenforceable in any event. The United 
States-Cuba trade of which Robert Morris and Francisco Rendon had 
dreamed quickly came to fruition as sugar production on the French is-
land of San Domingue plummeted, Spanish metropolitan shipping to 
its colonies slowed to a trickle, and the British verged on starving their 
own sugar islands by denying them access to American provisions. 3° In 
short, Lord Sheffield's scenario had been rendered obsolete. 
By the first decade of the nineteenth century, transatlantic realities 
continued to dim prospects for those with a mercantilist, and even a 
neomercantilist, bent. Valentin Foronda, the Spanish consul general 
who was stationed in Philadelphia between 1802 and 1807, recognized 
full well how U.S. merchants were already able to exploit the most dy-
namic market in the Caribbean, namely Cuba, the one that Lord Shef-
field and many early national historians have overlooked. As the skepti-
cal but obedient product of one imperial system and a shrewd admirer 
of the other, Foronda was uniquely positioned to observe the increas-
ingly divergent legacies of Spanish and British colonialism. 
29 L. K. Salvucci, "Anglo-American Merchants and Stratagems for Snccess"; Michael A. 
Otero, "The American Mission of Diego de Gardoqni, 1785-1789" (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1948); 
and Jose Antonio Armillas, "Viar y Jaudenes," in [no editor] Suma de Estudios Homenaje a 
Dr. Canellas (Zaragoza, 1969), 51-76. Some of the trading permits that Jaudenes and Viar is-
sued are preserved in the AGI, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 1469, a portion of which has been photo-
copied and is held at the Library of Congress. 
30 Emphasis upon the British starving their own islands is mine, but see Seymour 
Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition (Pittsburgh, 1977). The dating of 
the decline of the British West Indies is the subject of considerable scholarly debate. For two 
conflicting interpretations, see Selwyn H. H. Carrington, "The American Revolution and the 
British West Indies' Economy," in Barbara L. Solow and Stanley L. Engerman, eds., British 
Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery: The Legacy of Eric Williams (Cambridge, 1987), 135-
62; and John J. Mccusker, "Growth, Stagnation, or Decline? The Economy of the British 
West Indies, 1763-1790," in Hoffman et al., eds., The Economy of Early America, 275-302. 
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On Christmas Eve of 1803, Foronda wrote to his superiors in 
Spain: "As I've observed before, the ports with true trading privileges 
are not in Spain but rather here; and it appears that citizens of the 
United States hold exclusive trading rights with Cuba."31 This was 
hardly the intended result of nearly fifty years of Bourbon commercial 
reforms that were designed to modernize Spanish mercantilism, mov-
ing toward "freer trade" while still retaining privileges and profits within 
the empire. In this specific instance, "neomercantilist" is an apt charac-
terization of the sentiments. As a realist, even Foronda conceded that 
some direct trade between the United States and Spain's prized Carib-
bean colony had to be tolerated; otherwise, Cuban sugar production, 
not to mention crown revenues, would falter. In a comparative vein, it 
should be emphasized that this was a point most British policymakers 
apparently failed to grasp with regard to production on their own sugar 
islands. However, as the king's vigilant servant, Foronda maintained 
that such direct trade must be taxed; at the very least, he argued, Amer-
ican cargoes should be carried in Spanish ships so that some gains ac-
crued to Spain. To this end, his expanded network of Spanish consuls 
along the eastern seaboard was supposed to control traffic by selling 
shipping permits. But instead of purchasing them, Philadelphia ship 
captains had grown so bold that they would "come by to bid me farewell 
and ask if I wished to send some letters along with them." As Foronda 
himself recorded, he could only lower his head, shrug his shoulders, 
and pray silently that the king would recognize his faithful service. 32 
Some fifteen months later, the conscientious Basque catalogued a simi-
lar set of abuses perpetrated by the Philadelphia merchants; with a 
trace of resignation this time, he noted that it was like "preaching in the 
desert." But still he did not give up. With a certain degree of irony, he 
vowed in April of 1805 to withstand, "like the Rock of Gibraltar," yet 
another wave of American affronts.33 Thus did Valentin Foronda try to 
3
' Valentin Foronda (hereafter VF) to Pedro de Ceballos (hereafter PC), Phila., 24 Dec. 
1803, Archivo Hist6rico Nacional, Madrid (hereafter AHN), Estado, leg. 6175 bis. Foronda 
estimated that at least fourteen American ships then were in Havana harbor, and more were 
arriving daily. He had voiced similar complaints some nine months earlier: VF to PC, Phila., 7 
Apr. 1803; AGI, Indiferente General (hereafter IG), leg. 1604. Little had changed after two 
more years: VF to PC, Phila., 8 May 1805, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. 
32 VF to PC, Phila., 24 Dec. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. The consul general also 
complained that ship captains frequently advertised impending departures in the local news-
papers and then left for Havana without consulting him: VF to Miguel Cayetano Soler (here-
after MCS), Phila., 28 Mar. 1802, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175. 
33 VF to PC, Phila., 25 Jan. and 20 Apr. 1805, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. Examples of 
Foronda's frustration and siege mentality abound in the correspondence: VF to PC, Phila., 3 
Mar. and 8 Sept. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis; VF to PC, Phila., 29 Mar. 1803, AGI, IG, 
leg. 1604. 
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defend Spanish interest with a zeal that alternately amused and irritated 
even his fellow imperial bureaucrats.34 
Ridiculed in the streets by determined shippers and baited in the 
Philadelphia press by anti-Spanish publishers, Foronda enjoyed little 
popularity for discharging his consular duties.35 He did not realize, or 
quite probably did not care, how markedly his approach differed from 
that of his predecessors in the late 1790s. Spanish diplomats such as 
Gardoqui, Jaudenes, and Carlos Martinez de Irujo had cut dashing, or 
at least convivial, figures on the New York and Philadelphia social scenes. 
They entertained and were entertained by prominent American mer-
chants and politicians. They befriended and even married into distin-
guished regional trading and political families, including the Stoughtons 
and the McKeans. They took but sporadic note of widespread infractions 
of Bourbon commercial regulations, preferring instead to use their li-
censing powers to advance the fortunes of their favorites. Sometimes, 
they went so far as to strike their own business deals with American 
partners.36 The gulf between metropolitan policies and local enforcement 
was thus very wide in Spanish imperial interactions. 
Foronda, in vivid contrast to these earlier Spanish officials in resi-
dence, was a self-admitted workaholic and an elitist man of letters. By 
his own admission, he did not regularly travel by coach, and he "never 
went to teas or dances." Apparently, his grasp of spoken English was 
tenuous, although his son Fausto, the vice-consul, was fluent. Together 
they lived a quiet life in Philadelphia. In addition to completing routine 
paperwork, they read at least three regional newspapers daily, trans-
lated numerous official speeches and tracts for their peninsular superi-
ors, and authored several scholarly papers. Valentin Foronda cemented 
his relationships with men like Thomas Jefferson not with rounds of 
drinks at City Tavern, but rather through learned exchanges within the 
more intimate confines of the American Philosophical Society. 37 Foronda 
34 " ... and contrary to custom, [Foronda] is extremely succinct in this matter": [?]to Car-
los Martinez de Irujo , later the Marques de Casa Irujo (hereafter CMI), Aranjuez, 28 Jan. 
1806, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. Foronda repeatedly complained that higher-ranking Span-
ish officials refused to reply to his letters and improperly administered commercial laws: VF 
to PC, Phila., 20 Apr. 1803, AGI, IG, leg. 1604; copies ofletters sent by VF to the intendant of 
Cuba, Phila., 16 Nov. and 20 Dec. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg., 6175 bis. 
35 VFto PC, Phila., 8 Sept., 8 Nov., and 24 Dec. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis; the first 
letter relates how American shippers tried to force him to fill out certificates of good health 
for crews during an outbreak of yellow fever in the city. For libelous attacks upon the Spanish 
royal family in the local press, see VF to PC, Phila., 8 and 15 May 1805, AHN, Estado, leg. 
6175 bis. 
36 Irujo formed a business partnership with James Barry in 1797; CMI to Santa Clara, 
Phila., 13 Feb. 1797, AGI, Mexico, leg. 2486. To Foronda's great consternation, Irujo was also 
involved with John Craig, one of the most prominent merchants in Philadelphia: VF to MCS, 
Phila., 16 June and 21July1806, AGI, IG, leg. 1603. 
37 J. R. Spell, "An Illustrious Spaniard in Philadelphia, Valentin de Foronda," Hispanic 
Review 4, no. 2 (1936): 136-40; Robert S. Smith, "Valentin de Foronda, diplomatico y 
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also vigorously defended Spain when men on the street, be they aging 
McKeans or nameless mariners, crossed his path.38 Most important, to 
the best of his ability, he always tried to enforce both the letter and the 
spirit of Bourbon law in matters relating to commerce between America 
and the Spanish Empire. In so doing, Foronda clashed with Philadel-
phians and their Spanish collaborators who for years had profited from 
trading ventures, legal and otherwise. 39 
The feisty Basque may have put himself in a difficult position, but 
he was hardly a pathetic figure. Rather, Foronda was a perceptive and 
widely read political economist, far more so than Lord Sheffield. Like 
many educated men of his age, Foronda was profoundly influenced by 
the French physiocrats and by Adam Smith (whose Wealth of Nations, 
incidentally, was first translated into Spanish by Irujo, who, like Gar-
doqui, had been posted in London prior to his American appointment). 
To those who dealt with him in Philadelphia, the fact that Foronda 
came under suspicion in Spain for his "modern" views after the Bourbon 
restoration of 1814 might have seemed inconceivable. His published 
works were censored, and he died a broken man in 1823. Eventually, 
however, his reputation was rehabilitated, and he now enjoys consider-
able fame in the world of Hispanic letters. 4° 
economista," Revista de Economia Polftica 10, no. 2 (1959): 425-64, esp. 429. VF to PC, 
Phila., 14 Feb. 1807, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 for "no voy a los tes ni a los Bailes," as well as the 
observation that "los papeles publicos cuentan todo ... "; Fausto de Foronda to PC, Phila., 17 
and 24 Oct. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. Fausto was later sent to Baltimore to replace 
the consul there: VF to PC, Phila., 26 Mar. 1805, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. 
Foronda was elected a full member of the American Philosophical Society on 16 July 
1802; he immediately presented to that body several of his published treatises. Josef de 
Jaudenes had been elected in 1796, but he does not appear to have been very active or pro-
lific: American Philosophical Society membership file and general catalogue, Philadelphia. A 
published source claims that Irujo was also a member: Sandra Sealove, "The Founding 
Fathers as Seen by the Marques de Casa-Irujo," Americas 20 (1963): 37-42. On one occa-
sion, Foronda complained of the "pequefio numero de Econ6mico-politicos y de literatos que 
se encuentran aqui"; the rest of the time, however, he seemed quite happy with his intellec-
tual contacts: VF to PC, Phila., 30 Apr. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. 
38 VF to[?]. Phila., 20 July 1802, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175; VF to PC, Phila., 5 Apr. and 8 
Sept. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. It is unclear which McKean Foronda confronted; 
Irujo had married into that family in 1796. See Eric Beerman, "Spanish Envoy to the United 
States: Marques de Casa Irujo and His Philadelphia Wife Sally McKean," Americas 37 (1981): 
445-56. 
39 For over twenty years, John Leamy, a well-connected Irish Catholic merchant who set-
tled in Philadelphia after 1780, had virtual carte blanche to trade with Spanish imperial 
ports. Once Foronda arrived on the scene, however, Leamy began to experience unprece-
dented difficulties. The consul general's long-simmering quarrel with Irujo came to a head 
over the latter's support of Leamy, who was Jaudenes's landlord, in 1806: VF to PC, Phila., 14 
Jan. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis: CMI to[?], Phila., 28 Mar. 1806, AGI, IG, leg. 1603. 
4° Smith, "Valentin de Foronda," 428-38; Marcelo Bitar Letayf, Economistas espaiioles 
del siglo XVIII: sus ideas sobre la libertad del comercio con Indias (Madrid, 1968), 158-63; 
Robert J. Shafer, The Economic Societies in the Spanish World (1763-1821) (Syracuse, 
1958), 12-13, 40; Richard Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton, 
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Many of Foronda's writings professed great admiration for the eco-
nomic progress of the United States. In his 1804 treatise on the subject, 
the consul general acknowledged that his host nation could easily out-
supply Spain with foodstuffs, thanks to the richness of its soil. 41 In fact, 
Foronda repeatedly emphasized the industrious cultivation of its fertile 
lands as the foundation of U.S. prosperity. And while he had little re-
spect for the military abilities of "these Republicans," he often attested 
to their skill as merchants, if not to their preoccupation with making 
money. As for the North American merchant marine, Foronda concluded, 
in a vein reminiscent of Adam Smith's passage about the superior value 
of the physical capital of the Tartars compared with the silver assets of 
the Spanish kings: "Ten thousand vessels upon the seas-in truth, this 
is a wealth greater than the famous mountains of Potosi."42 From his 
practical experiences in regulating trade from Philadelphia, then, Foronda 
pronounced the Jeffersonian emphasis upon an agriculturally based 
foreign trade to be both proper and profitable. Thus, although Foronda 
did not fit easily into the social world of Philadelphia, he clearly shared 
much of the mind-set of the newly triumphant political party. 43 
1958), 55; and, more recently, Jose Manuel Barrenechea, "Valentin de Foronda ante la fi-
siocracia," in Ernest Lluch y Lluis Argemi I D'Abadal, eds., Agronomia y fisiocracia en Es-
pana (1750-1820) (Valencia, 1985), 153-83, which, interestingly enough, downplays the 
impact of Foronda's North American experiences on his thinking. 
41 Valentin de Foronda, "Apuntos ligeros sabre los Estados Unidos de la America Septen-
trional," Phila., 13 Mar. 1804, MSS., Obadiah Rich Collection, New York Public Library. A 
printed version is available in Jose de Onis, ed., "Valentin de Foronda's Memoir on the 
United States of North America, 1804," Americas 4 (Jan. 1948): 351-87. 
Foronda authored another piece in which he urged the King to relinquish some of his 
vast, but unproductive empire. The short-sighted ones, in Foronda's opinion, were those who 
believed it better for Spain to possess territory thousands of leagues far away than to cultivate 
its own rich soil, which would produce more than all of America if cared for properly: VF to 
PC, Phila., 20 Apr. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. 
42 
"Aqui hay muchos soldados en el nombre, pero sin disciplina ... no hay obediencia, no 
hay respecto a los Jefes": VF to PC, Phila., 5 Aug. 1805, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. "Solo 
piensan en ganar D6lares": VF to PC, Phila., 24 Jan. 1806, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175. Sealove, 
"The Founding Fathers," 37, quotes Irujo as observing that "money is the God of the Ameri-
cans." Some seven years later, Foronda wrote: "el Oro es el Dios a quien rinden adoraciones." 
VF to[?], Phila., 24 Jan. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. Also see Edwin Cannan, ed., Adam 
Smith: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations ([1776], 1904, Chi-
cago, rep. 1977), 450-51: "Wealth, therefore, according to them [the Tartars], consisted in 
cattle, as according to the Spaniards, it consisted in gold and silver. Of the two, the Tartar 
notion, perhaps, was nearest to the truth." 
43 The Jeffersonian view is ably sketched out in Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: 
Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); even more germane to this 
study is Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas J effer-
son ?"William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 39 (1982): 287-309. 
Foronda was delighted to report Jefferson's reelection to his superiors: VF to PC, Phila., 
13 Jan. 1805, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. Irujo also closely identified with the Jeffersonians: 
Sealove, "The Founding Fathers," 38-39. Moreover, the consul general probably attended 
services at Old St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church in Philadelphia, where many prominent 
Republicans worshipped. 
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What disturbed Foronda profoundly, however, was a phenomenon 
understood by some of the new officeholders but usually overlooked in 
the historiography of early national America. Not only was an entrepot 
like Havana the perfect market in theoretical terms for the new nation, 
since it required mainly foodstuffs and agricultural implements, rather 
than corruption-inducing manufactured goods. But the consul general's 
own carefully gathered statistics also demonstrated that early American 
commercial success occurred at the expense of Spain. It was bad enough 
that the metropolis itself imported grains worth millions of reales de 
vell6n annually from the United States.44 Even more horrifying to the 
good Spanish legalist was the extent to which Americans had pene-
trated Bourbon colonial markets. During the first decades of the nine-
teenth century, Cuba was fast becoming the richest colony in the world; 
yet the United States, not Spain, appeared to reap the greatest benefits. 
If one theme predominated in Foronda's official correspondence, it was 
the nearly total absorption of profits from Cuba by American merchants. 45 
Galled by negative references to Spain in the local press in August of 
1805, Foronda wondered, "If Spanish imperial ports were closed to 
them, where would they send their agricultural products, which repre-
sent all of their wealth?"46 Indeed, this was a telling point. Yet he need 
not have worried that the U.S. trade with Spain went unappreciated in 
the United States. Bluntly arguing against a possible war with Spain, a 
contemporary writer from the Richmond Inquirer observed that Ameri-
can exports to Spain had exceeded those to any other country in 1803. 
Moreover, he continued, without trade to the Spanish Caribbean and 
South America, "a considerable quantity of provisions and lumber would 
thus remain in our magazines without any profit, at the same time we 
should be shut out from the principal markets in which we obtain our 
real circulating medium." Like Foronda, this unidentified writer from Vir-
ginia recognized that American prosperity depended in no small part upon 
the Spanish Caribbean demand for U.S. foodstuffs and the correspond-
ing supply of Spanish American specie that flowed up through Cuba. 47 
44 VF to PC, Phila., Jan. 25, 1805, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis, wherein he lamented the 
lost opportunity to spend these funds on internal improvements in Spain, such as canals. 
45 Susan Schroeder, Cuba: A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston, 1982), 3; VF to 
PC, Phila., 7 Apr. 1803, AGI, IG, leg. 1604. 
46 VF to PC, Phila., 5 Aug. 1805, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. 
47 VF to PC, Phila., 2 Nov. 1804, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175, in which the consul general in-
cluded the previous day's issue of the Philadelphia Gazette and Daily Advertiser that con-
tained a reprint of the undated article from Richmond. Spanish American revolutionaries 
also appreciated this point: see Manuel Torres, An Exposition of the Commerce of Spanish 
America with Some Observations upon Its Importance (Phila., 1816), esp. 13-14. 
Foronda not only pinpointed Mexico and Peru as the predominant sources of specie for 
the United States; he also specifically tied specie supply trends to annual levels of activity in 
the American trade to the East Indies: VF to PC, Phila., 7 Apr. 1803, AGI, IG, leg. 1604; VF to 
PC, Phila., 25 Jan. 1805, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. 
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Foronda's observations raise an interesting issue. How had the United 
States, barely rid of its own colonial status, managed to gain control of 
another empire's most lucrative colonial trade? Because he arrived on 
the scene too late to witness its origins, Foronda never posed this ques-
tion directly. But his five-year catalog of U.S. commercial abuses does 
address the issue of how Americans habitually took advantage of prob-
lems of shipping and supply throughout the Spanish Empire. With nearby 
and remote ports alike, a "scandalous" contraband continued to flour-
ish. Foronda kept partial track of some specific cases, but he never pro-
vided any overall estimates. 48 Instead, he focused upon a few loopholes 
that vigilant Spanish bureaucrats could close without difficulty. Writing 
on this occasion with the outrage of a more traditional mercantilist, 
Foronda provided a series of recommendations that show subsequent 
historians the extent of U.S. commercial involvement with Cuba. 
According to the consul general, Cuban officials should stop the ad-
mission of American vessels that did not carry authentic licenses from 
him and his vice-consuls stationed in the larger U.S. ports. Forgers had 
become so careless that Spanish proper names were hilariously mis-
spelled; thus, they were easily identifiable. 49 Americans must also be 
discouraged from sailing indirect routes to Cuba, ending their practice 
of departing from smaller U.S. ports where no consuls resided or from 
ports of a third nation.5° Unlicensed arrivals, even in cases of ship-
wreck, which were often staged to gain entrance into ports, had to be 
turned firmly away.51 When admitted, vessels should be searched thor-
oughly for concealed goods. All permitted products should enter only 
after paying the requisite taxes. Ships should not be dispatched to the 
48 Almost every time that Foronda mentioned contraband, the word "escandoloso" pre-
ceded it. Following the Louisiana Purchase, he predicted that New Orleans would be the fo-
cus of contraband for the entire Gulf of Mexico: VF to PC, Phila., 24 Oct. 1803, AHN, Estado, 
leg., 6175 bis. Foronda also was concerned with attempts, often by New Englanders on whal-
ing expeditions to the South Atlantic or the northwest coast of America, to penetrate Peru-
vian and Chilean markets. After calculating the amount of declared cargo against the capacity 
of a specific ship's hold, he asked: "So are they carrying 1635 tons of air?": VF to PC, Phila., 
20 Aug. 1805, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. 
49 One letter in particular lists many of these loopholes: VF to PC, Phila., 3 Jan. 1803, 
AGI, IG, leg. 1604. Four months later, the consul general sarcastically enumerated them 
again and pointed out the obvious forgeries: VF to PC, Phila., 20 Apr. 1803, AGI, IG, leg. 
1604. 
5° Foronda was especially incensed over ships that cleared for the Floridas and then went 
on to Cuba: VF to MCS, Phila., 20 May 1803; VF to PC, Phila., 20 May and 23 July 1803, 
AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. For evidence of indirect trade via the Caribbean islands of other 
European powers, see Carmelo Richard Arena, "Philadelphia-Spanish New Orleans Trade: 
1789-1803" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1959). 
51 The consul general maintained that most shipwrecks were staged to gain entry to the 
Cuban ports. In cases when damaged ships were admitted, he recommended that, instead of 
allowing repairs to be financed by sales of cargoes, the vessels themselves should be sold at 
public auction: VF to PC, Phila., 23 Jun. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. 
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United States for needed supplies (breadstuffs, horses, wooden con-
tainers for shipping sugar) except in emergencies, and then only under 
the most circumscribed conditions; the same ships should be readmit-
ted with the authorized cargoes solely. Foreigners who took advantage 
of a royal policy that allowed them to sell extra flour in return for sup-
plying Cuba with slaves were not to be granted this concession merely 
for picking up a few unfortunate blacks on neighboring islands. 52 As 
much traffic as possible should be carried by Spanish-owned vessels 
manned by crews that were at least three-quarters Spanish. Tax incen-
tives to build up the Spanish merchant marine through the purchase of 
American ships had not been effective and thus needed to be revised. 
Those Americans and Spaniards who repeatedly transferred ownership 
of the same vessels back and forth should be stiffly taxed and/ or fined. 53 
And finally, according to Foronda, Spain should negotiate greater powers 
for its consuls stationed abroad. As the situation stood in 1803, Spanish 
diplomats had virtually no legal recourse in the United States, nor did 
they have any powers of enforcement at their disposal. Not even the 
basic rights of Spanish mariners could be protected sufficiently. 54 
Foronda's lengthy recommendations, often accompanied by sample 
passports and other suggested forms, fell on the proverbial deaf ears. 
Certain officials in Cuba even refused to acknowledge receipt of his let-
ters for nearly a year! Obviously, despite their formal instructions, they 
could ill afford to turn away American ships laden with vital provisions 
52 The policy of allowing American ship captains to sell cargoes of flour if they also 
brought in slaves was on the books as early as 1789. Foronda was especially disturbed by the 
American practice of transporting only four or five young black males from the Danish or 
Dutch islands and then demanding payment in sugar or specie. This put an additional strain 
on the Bourbon imperial economy without satisfying the problem of a labor shortage in 
Cuba: VF to PC, Phila., 7 Apr. 1803, AGI, IG, leg. 1604. Perceptive observer that he was, 
Foronda also recognized that some Americans had ambivalent thoughts about slavery in gen-
eral and the slave trade in particular: VF to PC, Phila., 8 Nov. 1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 
bis. 
53 Pointing out that it was the foreigners who always profited from these deals, Foronda 
proposed a four-year moratorium on the resale of ships that were purchased for the Spanish 
merchant marine. Otherwise, a 25 percent tax should be levied: VF to PC, Phila., 23 Jun. 
1803, AHN, Estado, leg. 6175 bis. Ship captains, he said, should be held directly responsible 
for most infractions, and fines should be set at between 1,000 and 2,000 pesos: VF to PC, 
Phila., 3 Jan. 1803, AGI, IG, leg. 1604. 
54 VF to PC, Phila., 29 Mar. and 7 Apr. 1803, AGI, IG, leg. 1604. Foronda genuinely cared 
about the welfare of sick Spanish mariners: VF to PC, Phila., 27 Dec. 1802 and 12 Oct. 1804, 
AHN, Estado, leg. 6175. Nevertheless, his problems in Philadelphia paled beside those of his 
American counterpart stationed in Santiago de Cuba. Not only did imperial officials refuse to 
recognize this agent formally; local administrators at one point threw him in jail: Josiah 
Blakeley to James Madison, Santiago de Cuba, 1 Nov. 1801, Dispatches from the United 
States Consuls in Santiago de Cuba, 1799-1906, National Archives ofthe United States, mi-
crocopy no. T-55, Washington, D.C., 1959, roll 1, vol. 1. Each side tried to limit the powers of 
the other's consuls, which strained relations even further. See also Nichols, "Trade Relations 
and the Establishment of United States Consulates," 289-313. 
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and agricultural implements. Faced with food shortages, both chronic 
and acute, the intendant of Cuba continued to issue his own licenses for 
purchasing expeditions in the United States. Moreover, local planters 
insisted that American ships were needed to carry away spoilable 
Cuban products in a timely fashion. 55 Likewise, in Spain, an unidenti-
fied imperial bureaucrat ridiculed Foronda's 1803 memorandum and 
justified official laxness and indiscretion point by point. The critic spe-
cifically advised that the consul general follow in his predecessors' foot-
steps and refrain from introducing any dreaded "innovations."56 In 
short, at least some peninsular bureaucrats had already given up, sur-
rendering, in effect, Spain's colonial commerce to the United States. 
With the disastrous political situation at home, this was hardly surpris-
ing. Still, in the one instance when they tried to make life difficult for 
American traders-by refusing to recognize U.S. consuls resident in 
Cuba-they only served to undermine even further Foronda's efforts to 
seek redress for Spanish grievances through the American courts. 
Aside from their inroads into Cuban commerce, American mer-
chants likewise capitalized on the apparent dependence of the Spanish 
peninsula itself on American products. This is graphically illustrated in 
Foronda's annual reports. To take the year 1806 as an example, the di-
mensions of Spanish reliance upon American shipping and supplies 
were staggering. There was some good news for Spain, as Foronda 
strained to point out. The 191 American ships that carried cargoes di-
rectly from the United States to the Spanish peninsula actually repre-
sented a decline of some fifty sailings annually over the previous two 
years. Likewise, the number of barrels of flour, bushels of corn, and 
quintals of tobacco had dropped markedly, if only temporarily. How-
ever, the amount of codfish that Spain imported from New England 
continued to increase, as did the quintals of cacao carried by American 
vessels to Spain from its own colonies. 
If the Spanish metropolis itself relied to such an extent upon Amer-
ican shipping, its colonies were dependent to an even greater degree. An 
estimated 600 ships from the United States officially entered Cuba in 
1806. And whereas only 14 vessels had docked formally at other Spanish-
American ports in 1804, at least 153 arrived a scant two years later. 
From other evidence, it is clear that this accelerating trend continued 
55 Peter James Lampros, "Merchant-Planter Cooperation and Conflict: The Havana Con-
sulado, 1794-1832" (Ph.D. diss., Tulane Univ., 1980), esp. 278-79, 312. 
56 This recommendation ("sin inovar") appears in the following file: Minister of State to 
VF, Aranjuez, Mar. 14, 1803, AGI, IG, leg. 1604. A few months later, possibly the same uni-
dentified advisor wrote: "se sirva prevenirle que siga en los mismos terminos que sus ante-
cesores sin causan molestias al poco comercio que tenemos." [?] to PC, Aranjuez, 2 Jun. 
1803, AGI, IG, leg. 1604. 
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throughout the next decade.57 American exports consisted mainly of a 
wide variety of provisions and simple construction materials. Foronda 
also calculated the number of American ships that were purchased by 
Spanish nationals. The extent to which these transactions should be 
credited to Americans, however, is obscured by the consul general's own 
admission that some were accomplished in name only, so as to circum-
vent entry restrictions upon foreign vessels in Spanish imperial ports. On 
the other hand, Foronda did not include in his estimates those ship 
sales, legitimate and otherwise, that occurred outside the United States. 
That trading contacts were extensive between the United States 
and the Spanish Empire comes as no surprise to those who peruse The 
American State Papers. 58 But Foronda's correspondence offers addi-
tional insights regarding the distribution of this trade among the vari-
ous American ports. From 1779 to roughly 1799, much of the available 
qualitative documentation suggests that U.S. trade to Cuba was cen-
tered in Philadelphia.59 Yet, as of 1804, Foronda's data indicate that 
most of the other larger U.S. ports enjoyed a healthy trade with Cuba as 
well. To use the year 1806 as an example, Foronda counted 97 depar-
tures for Cuba from Philadelphia alone, with Baltimore a close second 
at 90.60 However, over 100 ships returned from Cuba to each of the fol-
lowing ports in descending order: New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and 
Baltimore. At the same time, Charleston sent out 73 ships and wel-
comed in 95 vessels. Norfolk, Alexandria, and Savannah also were nur-
turing their respective contacts with Cuba, as witnessed by Foronda's 
haste to dispatch consuls to these smaller, southern ports. Of course, 
declared ship traffic is but one measurement of participation in trade. 
Yet whether one examines either the quantity of provisions sent (when 
reported) or the number and tonnage of ships sold to Spaniards, one 
point clearly emerges. All major American ports were vitally involved 
with Cuban and other Spanish imperial ports during the critical period 
of the Napoleonic Wars. 
57 Trade data and trends are laid out in chs. 2, 4, and 5 of Linda Kerrigan Salvucci, "Devel-
opment and Decline: The Port of Philadelphia and Spanish Imperial Markets, 1783-1823" 
(Ph. D. diss., Princeton University, 1985). 
58 Walter Lowrie and Matthew Clarke, eds., American State Papers, Class IV, Commerce 
and Navigation, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1832); most of these documents also appear in 
the first several volumes of The New American State Papers: Commerce and Navigation, 
with an introduction by Stephen E. Salsbury, 47 vols. (Wilmington, Del., 1973). 
59 AB consul general, Foronda's place of residence was not fixed. However, after talking 
with traders once he disembarked in Boston, he had chosen Philadelphia because, he con-
cluded, it was at the center of mercantile activities: VF to PC, Boston, 10 Jan. 1802, AHN, 
Estado, leg. 6175. 
60 U.S. customs records indicate that 117 ships cleared at Philadelphia for all Cuban ports 
that year: L. K. Salvucci, "Development and Decline," 325-26. 
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The consul general's qualitative assessments are readily confirmed 
by other, more quantifiable data. In the 1980s, estimates by a Spanish 
economist again attested to the aggregate significance of this trade. Fol-
lowing an export-led growth model, Javier Cuenca Esteban argued that 
net surpluses with the Spanish Indies and the Philippines between 1790 
and 1811 covered at least nine-tenths of American deficits with the rest 
of the world. Along with regional gains to the various port economies, 
then, this "timely windfall" also went a long way toward reducing the 
international indebtedness of the young United States. 61 
During his five-year tenure as consul general, Foronda labored 
mightily, but he could do little to stem the rising tide of commercial 
contacts between the United States and Spanish America in general 
and between Philadelphia and Cuba in particular. His efforts to tighten 
up the Bourbon trading system failed, and even his attempts to aug-
ment the royal coffers had little lasting effect. In the short run, he may 
have diverted some of the Spanish colonial trade away from the port of 
Philadelphia, since Irujo, his immediate superior, sought to hide from 
close scrutiny his own deep involvement in American trading ventures. 62 
In his early squabbles with Irujo, Foronda triumphed, replacing him as 
charge d'affaires in 1807. But if these smaller battles were won, then 
the larger struggle was lost. By the spring of 1809, Foronda's "liberal" 
sympathies raised concerns among his peninsular superiors. Reports 
from a disgruntled subordinate and rumors fanned by English diplomats-
perhaps the greatest tribute to his perspicacity-soon resulted in his re-
call to Spain. 63 
As Foronda prepared to return home, he accelerated his cherished 
correspondence with a fellow member of the American Philosophical 
Society, Thomas Jefferson. But even as the newly retired president re-
plied cordially to Foronda's letters, Jefferson also simultaneously spelled 
out for others his hopes regarding the Spanish West Indies. The calculated, 
if not cynical, tone of his remarks no doubt reflects an understanding of 
61 Cuenca Esteban, "Trends and Cycles," 540-41. 
62 VF to MCS, Phila., 16 Jun. and 21July1806, AGI, IG, leg. 1603. The prominent Phila-
delphian John Craig was identified as Irujo's "intimo amigo," "su socio de comercio en varias 
operaciones mercantiles .... " Foronda alleged that several departures from Boston, New 
York, and Baltimore were deliberately hidden from him. 
63 Felipe Fatio to PC, Phila., 18 Apr. 1809, AHN, Estado, leg. 6172, along with adjacent 
undated notes. Fatio, whose salary Foronda had withheld, claimed that conversations with 
some American citizens in New York led him to characterize the consul general's principles 
as follows: "son tanjlexibles que como la giralda de Sevilla se dexa torzer segun los vientos." 
Additional material related to this quarrel appears in Fatio to PC, Phila., 4 May 1809, Fatio to 
Martin de Garay, Phila., 27 and 30 Jun., 20 July, 2 and 9 Sept. 1809, AHN, Estado, leg. 6172. 
Also see Manuel Hernandez Gonzalez, "Comercio hispanoamericano e ideas afrancesadas: en 
torno a la polemica entre Valentin de Foronda y Francisco Caballero Sarmiento en Filadelfia 
(1808-10)," Cuadernos de Investigaci6n Hist6rica 13 (1990): 93-102. 
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the Cuba trade that dated back to his tenure as secretary of state in the 
1790s. By 1809, Jefferson was certain that the Floridas were "ours" and 
that Napoleon would "consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union .... " 
Over the next decade, his conviction grew that "Cuba will join us and 
give us sugar," since three-fourths of Havana's exports already came to 
the United States.64 By1823, there were several admissions like the fol-
lowing: "I candidly confess, that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most 
interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States."65 
With this, John Quincy Adams emphatically agreed. In a passage rou-
tinely quoted by Spanish Americans even to this day, the secretary of 
state declared that "Cuba ... has become an object of transcendent im-
portance to the commercial and political interests of our Union .... It is 
scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to 
our republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of 
the Union itself."66 On this occasion, however, Foronda did not com-
ment upon such impudent American sentiments. In one of those ironic 
historical coincidences, he died in 1823, just as the Monroe Doctrine 
was enunciated.67 
Conclusion 
Both Foronda's bureaucratic correspondence and his published 
works underscore the significant role that the Cuban market played in 
American commercial prosperity at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
They, along with Rend6n's memorials, indicate that Lord Sheffield's 
predictions were flawed, above all by his failure to take into account the 
existence of a substitute or alternative market to the British West In-
dies for U.S. domestic produce. Yet Foronda's observations suggest far 
more with regard to the narrowness of Sheffield's vision. In general, the 
writings of Valentin Foronda recognize the value of the human and 
physical capital accumulated by the Philadelphia merchants he sought 
so vainly to control. In particular, they allow us to appreciate fully the 
origins and extent of the trade between the United States and Cuba. 
64 Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington, D.C., 
1903): Thomas Jefferson (hereafter TJ) to VF, Monticello, 4 Oct. 1809, vol. 12, 318-21; TJ to 
James Madison, Monticello, 16 Aug. 1807, vol. 11, 326-27, and 27 Apr. 1809, vol. 12, 274-77; 
TJ to Henry Dearborn, Monticello, 5 Jul. 1819, vol. 19, 270-72; TJ to James Monroe, Monti-
cello, 23 Jun. 1823, vol. 15, 452-54. 
65 Lipscomb, ed., Writings of Thomas Jefferson: TJ to James Monroe, Monticello, 11 Jun. 
1823, vol. 15, pp. 435-38, and 24 Oct. 1823, vol. 15, pp. 477-80. 
66 Adams expressed these views in a letter written to the American minister in Spain on 
28 Apr. 1823; they are quoted at length in Charles E. Chapman, A History of the Cuban Re-
public: A Study in Hispanic-American Politics (Westport, Conn., rep. 1971 [c. 1927]), 51. 
67For Foronda's last years, see Smith, ''Valentin de Foronda," 432-35. 
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Reciprocal comparative advantages led to the integration of these rap-
idly expanding markets. Philadelphia's growing hinterland and trans-
atlantic networks allowed the region to supply Cuba with needed food-
stuffs precisely as the island underwent its first "sugar revolution." 
More to the point, these processes occurred outside the control of im-
perial policymakers, either Spanish or British, thus underscoring the 
breakdown of mercantilist empires during the half-century after 1763. 68 
An Atlantic approach to early American commerce not only serves 
to fill in gaps in the basic story but also to connect the work of business 
and economic historians to broader analyses of the American past. For 
example, such an outlook attests to the privileged material circum-
stances under which the United States was born. Robert Morris and 
Alexander Hamilton certainly understood the extent to which fiscal sta-
bility would enhance the political stability of the new nation. It was, to 
be sure, a reality that eluded most Latin American counterparts, even 
as Mexican silver continued to flow northward. But to those who read 
Rendon's and Foronda's assessments of the commercial capacities of 
the new United States, all this should have come as little surprise. 
An Atlantic perspective also raises interesting issues relating to the 
nature and consequences of British colonialism. If imperial administra-
tors in London did not know how to think triumphantly after 1763, they 
clearly had acquired a ruthless streak in the wake of the American war. 
Once the political bonds between metropolis and colonies were severed 
by mainland revolutionaries, the British struggled to exploit their re-
maining West Indian colonies in the face of economic stagnation and 
decline. The precise dating of these trends has been the subject of con-
siderable scholarly efforts, but a larger point is now evident. 69 The 
"decline" of the British Caribbean corresponded with the "rise" of the 
Spanish West Indies. In this context, the collective activity of early 
American merchants in Cuba was sweet revenge, as they quickly dem-
onstrated that an alternative existed to Jamaica and other British is-
land markets. Even more to the point, the politics of the British anti-
slavery movement coincided with the emergence of a more efficient 
producer of sugar, namely Cuba. As metropolitan activists focused their 
energies on emancipation in the British West Indies, Cuba was able to 
68 Frarn;ois Crouzet, "America and the Crisis of the British Imperial Economy, 1803-
1807," in McCusker and Morgan, eds., The Early Modern Atlantic Economy, 278-315, high-
lights Great Britain's difficulties in enforcing a restrictive trade policy during the Napoleonic 
years. See Silvia Marzagalli's article in this issue of the Business History Review for an analy-
sis of increased French trade with former British colonies. 
69 See the works and their bibliographies cited in note 30, as well as David Beck Ryden, 
"Does Decline Make Sense? The West Indian Economy and the Abolition of the British Slave 
Trade," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 31 (Winter 2001): 347-74. 
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ensure its labor supply by importing ever more slaves from Africa. 7° So 
long the beneficiaries of preferential treatment within the empire, Brit-
ish West Indian planters were now deprived of vital food supplies from 
the U.S. mainland that, to make matters worse, were redirected to 
Cuba, their most serious competitor. Ultimately, the coup de grace for 
the British West Indies came in 1846, when Great Britain abolished 
preferences for British Caribbean sugar, thereby granting metropolitan 
consumers ready access to the Spanish West Indian product! In other 
words, in an ironic twist of the Williams thesis, British policymakers at-
tempted to forestall potential worker unrest at home at the expense of 
their once-favored colonial producers.71 It was they who paid the price 
for Lord Sheffield's punitive strategy, while Americans cemented a cru-
cial commercial relationship with Cuba, one that ultimately ushered in 
a new age of imperialism. 
70 David R. Murray, Odious Commerce: Britain, Spain and the Abolition of the Cuban 
Slave Trade (Cambridge, 1980), and Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Trans-
atlantic Slave Trade, cited above in note 1. 
71 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill, 1944), and Sidney Mintz, Sweet-
ness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York), 1985. 
